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Abstract
Small companies need help to detect and to respond to increasing security related threats. This paper presents a cloud
service that automates processes that make checks for such threats, implement mitigating procedures, and generally
instructs client companies on the steps to take. For instance, a process that automates the search for leaked credentials
on the Dark Web will, in the event of a leak, trigger processes that instruct the client on how to change passwords and
perhaps a micro-learning process on credential management. The security governance service runs on the cloud as it
needs to be managed by a security expert and because it should run on an infrastructure separated from clients. It
also runs as a cloud service for economy of scale: the processes it runs can service many clients simultaneously, since
many threats are common to all. We also examine how the service may be used to prove to independent auditors
(e.g., cyber-insurance agents) that a company is taking the necessary steps to implement its security obligations.
Keywords: Security, Security as a service, Compliance, Cloud, Process modeling, Burden of proofs
Introduction
Cyber-security is a major concern for today’s economy
and society. It is a particular problem for small compa-
nies since they can lack the means to defend themselves
[16]. First, they might not be technically savvy enough
to understand the security problem and understand the
measures that have to be taken. Second, small compa-
nies might not be able to invest in security solutions
from their working capital. Third, their IT infrastructure
is often very minimal, for instance, many small compa-
nies still manage their client database, containing client
personal data and credit card information, with desk-
top spreadsheet software. This all makes small companies
particularly vulnerable to cyber-security attacks.
Compliance, which is the process of respecting govern-
ment regulation in the operation of business, is another
factor of risk for companies. Obviously, compliance reg-
ulations are enacted in the interests of consumers and
society, but the implementation of compliance within
a company is costly, as is the failure to be compliant.
The European Union’s General Data Protection Regu-
lation (GDPR) on the protection of personal data is a
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good example of the challenge. The GDPR applies to all
companies, irrespective of their size and business sector,
and requires companies to take specific protective mea-
sures for client personal data. Repeated failure to adhere
to GDPR can incur severe penalties, e.g., up to 4% of
annual turnover. Like for security, small companies are
struggling to conform to GDPR [6]. It is useful to tackle
security and compliance together as both are concerned
with controls on information handling.
Security Governance deals with the definition and
implementation of processes to mitigate security risks. In
an era of zero-day exploits, companies must accept that
attacks will happen and some will succeed, so governance
processes deal equally with prevention (security software
installation, training, etc.), detection (data leaks in the
Dark Web, etc.) and recovery (password resets, informing
clients of data leaks for GDPR, etc.). Security governance
also applies to protection of physical assets from theft or
damage [14].
This paper presents the design and implementation of a
security governance service. Processes are automated on
a cloud service on behalf of client companies. The cloud
is chosen since the processes are put in place by a secu-
rity expert, and processes run in a secure infrastructure
independent of the client. Further, for economy of scale,
processes may run on behalf of many clients. The model
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presents a company with a dashboard showing risk for
their company. Risk-mitigating processes are manually or
automatically started in response to detected threats.
A particular feature of our approach is that processes
may request attestation evidence from clients to show that
they are following the steps requested by the processes.
Evidence is collected at runtime, and can be used by exter-
nal parties like auditors, insurance providers, etc. Thus,
even in the event of a successful security attack at the
client site, the client can still show that steps to prevent
the attack had been taken.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
“Approach to security governance” section motivates
the design of the governance model. Some processes
are presented in “Governance processes” section, and
the model’s implementation in “Implementation” section.
Related work is presented in “Related work” section. Con-
clusions and future work are discussed in “Conclusions”
section.
Approach to security governance
The objective of the security governance model is, fol-
lowing the identification of assets, to implement pro-
cesses to secure these assets. This approach to security is
expounded by frameworks like the IEC/ISO 27000 series
[5]. In our case:
• The model implements a risk management service
that permits a company to track security risks and
instructs on actions to take to mitigate risk. The
service is managed by a trusted third party. This party
can follow risk in real time, and like an asset manager
surveying a financial portfolio, trigger processes to
alter overall risk.
• We seek to automate governance processes as much
as possible – several examples are presented in
“Governance processes” section. Process automation
in the enterprise environment is known to reduce
errors and increase efficiency [7].
• Permit attestation of the implementation of
risk-mitigating processes to third parties such as
government auditors verifying compliance or to
insurance agents verifying that contractual actions
are being taken. An example of the latter might be
the installation of anti-virus software that is required
by a cyber-protection insurance policy.
• Exploit commonalities in risks faced. For instance, all
companies face risks relating to malware or
reputation, and the remedial actions are the same.
This enables the trusted third party to reuse the same
processes for many clients.
• Be simple for small companies to use, and require no
special technical expertise on their part. Moreover,
the processes must represent a range of risks faced by
such companies. Many different risks have an equally
fatal impact on the company. For instance, for a hair
salon we contacted considered risk linked to data loss
to be as important as risk linked to malfunction of
hair-drying equipment. Small firms appreciate a
package solution for risk, rather than having to
delegate different risks to different consultants.
Fig. 1 Actors of the governance model. The arrows denote data flows. The governance provider offers a trusted environment in which it tracks risk
for the client company and furnishes proof of implementation of risk-mitigating actions to auditors
Bryce Journal of Cloud Computing: Advances, Systems and Applications            (2019) 8:23 Page 3 of 14
Fig. 2 Simple dashboard example
Actors
As illustrated in Fig. 1, there are three roles in the model:
clients, governance providers and auditors.
A governance provider hosts the risk management ser-
vice for client companies. He is an expert in risk and helps
the client to identify assets, threats, vulnerabilities and
actions to undertake to mitigate risks. This endeavor is
facilitated by the fact that many risks are shared by all
clients, e.g., theft, ransomware virus, etc., even if the risk
level differs between clients. The provider runs a service
that tracks the risk level of the client.
The client is any small or micro company that avails of
the provider’s riskmanagement service. He is not assumed
to have any expertise in security or compliance. Apart
Fig. 3 Panel of the Governance Service
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Fig. 4 Processes run on engine in a trusted environment
from regular discussions with the provider about the
assets, threats and risks, his interaction with the service is
limited to receiving alerts and instructions, and filling out
Web-forms.
For each client, there may be distinct actors who fulfill
different roles within the company, and who therefore exe-
cute different tasks. For instance, the office manager has
different responsibilities to a security guard. Both execute
different tasks of the client: the office manager executes
tasks relating to defense (e.g., install anti-virus, etc.), the
security guard is responsible for doing rounds, verifying
the clean desk policy, etc.
An auditor is any independent party who wishes to see
the status of the implementation of risk-mitigating actions
by the client. In practice, this role is taken by a gov-
ernment auditor wishing to verify the implementation of
compliance actions within the company, or by an agent
of a cyber-insurance company who wishes to verify that
prescribed risk-mitigating processes were implemented
by the client following a claim made on its behalf.
Service components
There are two parts to the service offered by the gov-
ernance provider. A dashboard front-end presents the
client with an overview of the current risk state and
actions to execute; a back-end engine automates the risk-
mitigating actions for the client.
Dashboard
An example of an initial dashboard defined for a small
company is illustrated in Fig. 2. Please note that for rea-
sons of brevity, several assets and risks are omitted. The
dashboard has an easy-to-interpret tabular format. Fol-
lowing an ISO 27000 like approach [5], and with the help
of the provider, the client defines the assets he wishes to
protect in the first column. Identified threats are listed
in the second column and vulnerabilities that make these
threats credible are listed in the third column.
A risk level value along with some risk condition that
explains the risk level are given in columns 4 and 5. A risk
mitigating process, composed of actions, for the threat-
Fig. 5 Simple BPMN process
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Fig. 6 Process for cabinet locking
vulnerability is mentioned in column 6 and the impact
of execution of the process on the risk level is given in
column 7.
The table is deliberately descriptive in a first step
because it represents the level of detail employed in an
interaction between a client and governance provider. The
trigger conditions and the actions are programmatically
defined in a second stage by the provider. The result is
shown in Fig. 3 – a screenshot from our service.
The dashboard in Fig. 3 contains the risk variables
defined for the client. Two classes of variables can be
defined:
• Client-related, e.g., assurance_purchased,
data_breach_signaled, etc. These variables can only
be updated by processes deployed on the engine.
• Provider variables relating to some service that the
provider handles, e.g., ransomware_alert_issued for a
service that tracks CVEs for malware. The
maintenance of these variables is the responsibility of
the provider. He may change the value of these
variables which can trigger a process as a
consequence.
Engine
The engine runs in an isolated and trusted environment,
under the supervision of the provider. The engine exe-
cutes programmed actions for notification, confirmation
by clients or custom tasks. Access control ensures that
a process action for a client may only be executed by
that client. The environment stores client risk values and
these may not be directly modified except through the
execution of actions.
A process is composed of a series of actions. The
types of process actions in the governance model are the
following.
• A notification action alerts the client of some task
that needs to be done, and can contain detailed
instructions. Concretely, the notification arrives by
email or phone, and the action might be the renewal
of an insurance contract, a reminder to empty the
cash register at the end of the day or instructions on
how to patch a CMS application.
• A confirmation action is what a client uses to
confirm in a provided Web-form that that he has
undertaken a certain manual task. Execution of this
task is used for attestation, i.e., to demonstrate
whether the client has executed his attributed tasks.
• An inform action is used by a client to communicate
with some other user. For instance, this could be used
by a manager informing employees about the Internet
usage policy. In this way, an employee cannot later
claim unawareness in the event of a dispute.
• A burden of proof action BoP permits a client to
provide specific proof of the implementation of some
task for attestation. For instance, if the task is the
installation of anti-virus software on his PC, the proof
might be the screenshot of the folder with the
software or the list of running applications containing
the anti-virus software.
Fig. 7Micro-learning process can be triggered by a process managing password leaks
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Fig. 8 Process watching for Data Leaks
• A custom action is any other type of action that the
provider may care to implement. One example is a
service task that scrapes Web sites for indications of a
data leak involving the company (e.g., via
haveibeenpwned.com). Another example of a custom
action is an on-line training course.
• An expression action updates the dashboard’s client
variables, e.g., for a process accompanying the round
of a security guard, the expression actions updates
the time of the guard’s last check.
As mentioned, one objective of the model is to per-
mit attestation of the implementation of governance pro-
cesses by a auditor. Two classes of information are avail-
able for this purpose. First, the status of process execution.
This consists of the list and times of processes executed,
as well as the state (current action and previous execu-
tion times) of currently executing processes. Second, data
uploaded through BoP actions also constitutes attestation
evidence.
An overview of our architecture is presented in Fig. 4.
Governance security processes run on a process server on
the cloud. The service can be used simultaneously by dif-
ferent clients, so there is a usermanagement database. The
service provider may include other useful services such as
a CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) feed that
is used to trigger client processes when a relevant virus
alert is detected. As will be explained in “Implementation”
section, programs called compliance agents (CA) are
placed within the client IT infrastructure. These are
responsible for uploading data to server processes through
BoP actions.
Governance processes
Processes are programmed using the Business Process
Model and Notation (BPMN) standard from the Object
Management Group [18]. The language is now widely
used in industry. The primary purpose of this language
is a means of specification that is accessible to all stake-
holders of a company, and not just the IT developers.
This explains its largely shape-based, non textual, syntax.
This argument is particularly relevant to security and
compliance since the specification of security policies and
their enforcement depend on end-users, IT administra-
tors, management, legal and HR.
BPMN specifications are not just about modeling. Many
platforms exist to execute BPMN processes. Open-source
BPMN platforms include Bonita BPM [4], Red Hat’s JBoss
BPM suite jBPM1 and Camunda2.
The tasks of the BPMN processes do the actual work.
Each BPMNplatform has its own types of implementation
tasks, though they are generally similar. The platform used
for our implementation is Camunda, and has the following
types of tasks, illustrated in the small process example of
Fig. 5.
• The first task, “Email Alice”, is a message task. This is
used to implement the Inform action of the
governance model.
• A service task is an automated work item task. The
Camunda platform allows Java or Groovy code to be
linked to this task and executed when the task is
activated. Our implementation uses this task type to
implement notification and custom actions. An
example custom action that we developed is a training
task that presents video content to users. Expression
tasks are also implemented as service tasks.
• The third task in the process of Fig. 5 is a user task. In
our implementation, we use this to implement
1jbpm.org
2www.camunda.com
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Fig. 9 Process triggered when data leak detected
confirm actions within a Web form. These forms are
the means by which users may manually update
variables. The task is executed by a user logging into
the system, loading and submitting the Web form.
Another useful feature of BPMN is the swim-lane con-
cept. This is a row that is drawn over tasks, and to which
a user or group of users is assigned. In Fig. 5, user Bob is
attributed the three tasks. The swim-lane denotes autho-
rization and responsibility. The owning user or group
is the only user allowed to execute tasks in the swim-
lane. Swim-lanes are thus the means that access control is
implemented, and in particular, how different tasks can be
attributed to employees with different roles within a client
company.
Returning to the example of Fig. 2, one of the asset-
threat pairs identified was theft of the credit card reader.
The proposed process is to store the item in the cabinet
each night before leaving. The process deployed in our
framework is shown in Fig. 6.
The start event of this process is a BPMN timer event.
This event is programmed to start a process at a desig-
nated or at regular intervals. In this case, the process is
scheduled each evening. The first task of the process is
a notification task. This task type sends a message to the
client. The message text and receiver identifier are spec-
ified as parameters to the task. The second task is a user
task, and represents the action that the client is requested
to do. The user task is a Web form with has explicatory
text about what the client is requested to do, and a con-
firm button that the client uses to claim that the task has
been done. This is the platform’s manner of noting actions
done on the client side.
Sample process portfolio
For a micro or small company, several risks are recur-
rent. One is loss or theft of passwords. Another is data
leakage, where either they are the subject of the leak-
age, or their client data that they manage gets leaked. In
the latter case, the dispositions of the GDPR come into
play. Another risk is for micro-companies is a bad on-line
review. Though this risk is not traditionally considered
a security risk, all micro-companies insist upon this risk
since a bad review can have a serious impact on their busi-
ness. In any case, security is about protecting assets –
and reputation, though intangible, is definitely a company
asset.
In helping a client company, the governance provider
selects process descriptions from a database of processes,
Fig. 10 Requirement for validating action has been performed
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Fig. 11 Anti-virus installation process with BoP
and customizes them for the client. Given the aforemen-
tioned risks, one process deployed could be a micro-
training process, c.f., Fig. 7. Note that this process has
a message start event, meaning that the process can be
started by another process that sends it a message. The
governance provider may also start it manually on the
client’s behalf. This process has a custom training task
that, in this case, displays a video about password man-
agement. This message event approach allows security
training to be delivered at the most pertinent moment,
e.g., by a process that detects a password leak sending a
message to trigger the training.
A process that checks for data leaks is shown in Fig. 8.
It contains a service task that integrates a call to the REST
interface of the haveibeenpwned.com site. The addresses
to check for are stored as process variables. In the event
of a data leak detection, the end event is a message event
that triggers the GDPR process shown in Fig. 9.
The GDPR process takes dispositions required under
the GDPR. The process has a parallel treatment. In the
top part, a sub-process has tasks to inform members of
the company about the leak, followed by a sub-process
to inform clients. In the bottom part, a timer is triggered
which runs for 72 h – the limit within which clients must
be informed of the leak.
Other processes developed include a reputation check
process that is triggered by a timer event. Currently,
this contains a service call to the Google Places API
to check for any negative reviews. Obviously, calls to
any sentiment analysis site could be integrated. Another
class of processes that we are working on are for data
backup and restoration. While our server runs processes
to explain how backups and restorations can be done, and
which inform the client to trigger a backup, the actual
backup and restoration are done using scripts within the
client IT infrastructure.
Burdens of proof
Recall that a primary goal of our framework is to help
demonstrate that processes are being implemented, and
consequently security is being enforced. One reason for
outsourcing process execution to a trusted third party
is that it maintains a trace of process executions. For
instance, when the confirm action is executed in the sec-
ond task of Fig. 6, the server notes that the client handled
the cabinet lockup request and notes the time. If ever a
theft is signaled, the client can use this process execution
history to demonstrate the actions taken prior to the theft.
However, sometimes stronger proofs than client con-
firmation are required to ensure that an action has been
performed by the client. The scenario to implement is
demonstrated using BPMN in Fig. 10 using the swim-
lanes. The system administrator installs anti-virus soft-
ware. The next task executed is the responsibility of the
auditor whose role is to validate the installation. Only then
can the system administrator execute the next step of the
process – informing management in this example.
Our goal is to automate the role of the auditor. To this
end, we extend the BPMN model with annotations called
burdens of proof (BoP). These are a form of intermediate
event within a process. A BoP acts as a synchronous
rendezvous point; process execution can only continue
Fig. 12 DMN Decision table for antivirus installation process
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Fig. 13 Process Platform Stack Architecture
once evidence has been provided to a burden of proof and
then validated. Figure 11 shows a simple example with a
burden of proof element. A client installs an anti-virus
software and then informs management. Before doing
so, a proof of installation must be sent to the server.
Without this, process execution does not continue to the
notification task.
The service provider and company define a policy for
a BoP that defines the evidence that must be furnished
to the BoP. In our current implementation, this policy
is expressed using Decision Model Notation (DMN) [12],
and an example is shown in Fig. 12. DMN is a notation for
decision modeling from the Object Management Group.
Each decision is represented by a table, with input argu-
ments and corresponding outputs. The inputs are taken
from a process’ variables at runtime.
The simplified example policy in Fig. 12 specifies evi-
dence needed for demonstrating that an anti-virus was
installed. The policy is based on a variable count that rep-
resents the number of recognized anti-virus applications
installed on the client site. This variable is input to the
policy object’s decision table. Policies can have any num-
ber of input columns and there is a single output column
to indicate whether the process can continue or not. In
this policy, the BoP allows execution to continue so long
as there is at least one recognized anti-virus application.
The syntax of the cell expressions is defined by the tools
we use in our implementation3.
Implementation
We use Camunda’s community edition4 as the process
engine of our platform. As shown in Fig. 13, Camunda
supports BPMN 2.0 and DMN 1.1. Camunda is an open-
source platform and is one of the leading BPMN platform
providers around. The platform has a REST interface
3We are using the Camunda platform (www.camunda.com) which supports
DMN. This implementation supports JUEL (Java Unified Expression
Language) and FEEL (Friendly Enough Expression Language) expressions in
cells.
4www.camunda.com
for manipulating process descriptions, process instances,
variables and users. Camunda is packaged as a servlet and
we run it over an Apache Tomcat Web server container.
For the process platform, the choice was made to
use customizable off-the-shelf components. Our process
environment runs in parallel to the Camunda/Apache
server over a MERN stack (MongoDB, Express, React
and Node). This environment manages the process
descriptions, c.f., Fig. 14, with a link to an editor for creat-
ing and editing descriptions, a deploy and un-deploy func-
tion, as well as a start process button. Process deployment
and starting are implemented using Camunda’s REST
interface for process control. In addition, the portal has a
window with the list of currently running processes and
active tasks that a user has to execute. Another window
offers metrics on process descriptions and instances.
The portal’s process editor, c.f., Fig. 15, is an extension
of Camunda’a open source editor5. The extension includes
support for burdens of proofs and the customized task
types – training task, notification task, etc.
As mentioned, compliance agents are deployed on the
side of the client organization. We currently run them as
protected Ruby scripts, but since they communicate over
HTTP, any technology can be used to implement them.
The platform runs an agent daemon that receives HTTP
calls from compliance agents and forwards them to the
pertinent BoP element to trigger evaluation.
A compliance agent used for the anti-virus example is
shown in Fig. 16. It is just a Ruby script that verifies the
list of installed programs and compares to the recognized
list of programs – McAfee and BitDefender in this exam-
ple and submits the resulting count value. On Mac OS
platforms, the list of installed programs is given in the
/Library/Receipts/InstallHistory.plist file.
Though we have extended BPMN with BoP elements,
this extension is actually implemented using other BPMN
elements. That is, a process from our framework that
contains BoP elements is rewritten in pure BPMN as
5https://github.com/bpmn-io
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Fig. 14 Screenshot of process descriptions
soon as it gets deployed. This approach has the significant
advantage that we did not need to modify the Camunda
process engine, and that processes from our library can
run on any BPMN 2.0 platform.
In the BPMN process transformation that occurs on
deployment, each BoP is transformed into the sub-process
task shown in Fig. 17. One of the task types supported
by Camunda is a Business Rule Task. This task evaluates
a DMN decision table. As mentioned, each BoP has an
argument DMN policy decision table and this is what gets
linked to the business rule task. The policy outputs true
or false, depending on the evidence provided. A negative
decision leads to the BoP generating an error event which
is caught by the second sub-process in the Figure. Finally,
the BoP gets triggered by a receive message event. This is
triggered by a message sent to the platform, which is trig-
gered by the HTTP request made by the corresponding
compliance agent on the client IT system.
The compliance agent must be protected from tam-
pering so that evidence is not fabricated. Currently, we
run them as setuid enabled programs on our POSIX
platforms, where the user identity attributed to the pro-
grams is that of an administrator of the process platform.
The only drawback is this does not handle the threat
of a malicious IT administrator. This is the subject of
current work. Among the possible solutions, the Intel
SGX (Software Guard Extensions) mechanism allows user
code and data to be placed within memory enclaves [3].
Enclave memory cannot be directly accessed by code
running in kernel mode. This means that we can run
code that is safe from manipulation by kernel-level code,
and thus, safe from manipulation by malicious admin-
istrators. An example of its use for secure databases is
presented in [15].
Related work
BPMN has been used on several occasions for modeling
security in the context of business processes [8]. Themoti-
vation for this is the undoubted success that the language
has as a modeling and orchestration tool within industry,
but since the language only specifies functional require-
ments, security needs somehow to be added to the process
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Fig. 15 Screenshot of process editor
descriptions. The general approach is to extend BPMN
with security features.
Two examples of this are SecBPMN [17] and
SecureBPMN [9]. SecBPMN extends BPMN with anno-
tations for accountability, audit, authenticity, availability,
confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and privacy.
The result is a modeling language for secure business
processes. In addition, the authors also develop an icon
based query language in [17] that is used to verify security
properties of a process. A key disadvantage of extending
BPMN in this way is that compatibility with BPMN plat-
forms is lost. SecureBPMN is an earlier effort, with fewer
annotations. In our work, though we have added a new
BPMN element – the BoP – there is a rewriting rule to
transform this to pure BPMN. Further, our concern is not
to add security to existing BPMN workflows, but to use
BPMN to implement many of the security processes that
companies need to implement.
In [1], the authors do present BPMN patterns for
GDPR, e.g., consent to use data, right to access data,
right of portability, right to withdraw, right to rectify, and
right to be forgotten. These are extremely useful; in our
work, we seek to implement a larger portfolio of security
processes.
Another axe of related work is the use of cloud services
for security. The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) provide
a definition of Security as a Service (SecaaS): a cloud
infrastructure that provides security services such as iden-
tity management, data loss prevention, Web and mail
security, Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery, as
well as security information and event management. This
underlines the trend that outsourcing security to third-
party providers is now a viable option for companies.
Nevertheless, the introduction of a new third-party has an
implication on risk, as companies require that the cloud
service be secure. In [19], the authors present a secu-
rity model for securing cloud services. All data objects
stored by the cloud server have annotations that can be
used to express privacy and access control properties.
These permit services to be constructed in a security-by-
design approach. Such an approach could be applied to
this paper’s service.
Yet confiding security and data to a cloud service can
be perceived as risky and many seek better transparency
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Fig. 16 Compliance agent for antivirus example
between cloud customers and providers [13]. Notably,
while security techniques have improved, techniques aim-
ing at security transparency and mutual accountability
have lagged behind. In [11], a model for formalizing the
trust relationship with the cloud service is presented. This
is important since local IT infrastructures delegate control
and pass sensitive data to the service. We could leverage
this model for passing burden of proof documents to the
process server in future work.
The cloud is often seen as the ideal host for security
operation centers [10]. However, these are designed with
larger companies in mind. Small companies are often not
economically attractive. As a result, they adopt generic
solutions like standard anti-virus software and firewalls
installed by their telephony provider. Obviously these are
important solutions, but security also requires process
that are customized for each company. We contend that
the high degree of process automation possible and the
overlap of risks between companies create the economy of
scale needed to make the service a viable one.
Adamant is another framework for security automation
[2]. The goal is to be aligned to the ISO 27001 standard.
The UML language is used for describing assets in a
catalog. A statemachinemodel then describes asset states,
e.g., for compliance, and the Spring expression language
is used for this. States evolve as actions are reported to
the system. Our work complements Adamant by focus-
ing more on the operational processes that must be put in
place for governance.
Conclusions
This paper has presented the design and implementation
of a model for security governance. Increasingly, it is nec-
essary for companies to demonstrate implementation of
security processes so that they do not become liable in
the event of an attack leading to a data loss, and so that
they can demonstrate compliance with legislation like the
GDPR. These requirements led us to a cloud solution
where the participation of a trusted independent party is
leveraged for its competence in the security domain as
well as for proof of process implementation.
The service uses the BPMN language to express security
and compliance processes. These are executed in real-
time on a process engine on the cloud. BPMN is extended
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Fig. 17 Implementation of the BoP element
with annotations for burdens of proof. These represent
points in the process where evidence must be furnished
and validated for execution to continue. These consti-
tute proof of implementation of the process for manage-
ment and auditors. The BoP elements are implemented in
BPMN, so processes from the library can be run on any
BPMN platform.
Future work includes investigating implementation
techniques for compliance agents that protect their execu-
tion in environments where the administrator is hostile.
Abbreviations
BoP: A Burden of Proof is an element that we added to BPMN to model the
exchange of proof between a client and the cloud service; BPMN: The Business
Process Model and Notation is a modeling language defined by the Object
Management Group (OMG) for expressing business processes and workflows;
CA: A compliance agent is a program placed on the client site that exchanges
proof data with the process executing on the cloud service. DMN: The Object
Management Group (OMG) have defined the DecisionModel and Notation
standard for formally modeling decision trees; GDPR: The General Data
Protection Regulation is an EU regulation that defines conditions on the
handling of personal data in IT systems. The GDPR came into effect on May
25th 2018; ISO/IEC: The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and
the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) have defined a family of
standards for information security
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to the RCSO ISNET research program for funding this
research. The author thanks Sylvain Muller for his help developing the platform.
Authors’ contributions
The author read and approved the final manuscript.
Authors’ information
The author is an associate professor at the Geneva School of Business
Administration at the University of Applied Sciences and Arts of Western
Switzerland. Research at this university is generally applied, and conducted in
close collaboration with local industry.
Funding
This research has been funded by a research program of the University of
Applied Sciences and Arts of Western Switzerland named RCSO ISNET, grant
number 86112/ES-ISNET18-04.
Availability of data andmaterials
The model proposed in this paper is inspired by the author’s experience in
industry and on informal discussions with companies. There is no formal data
set. Any further information is available on demand from the author.
Competing interests
There are no competing interests involving the author in the execution of this
research work.
Received: 23 April 2019 Accepted: 10 December 2019
References
1. Agostinelli S, Maggi FM, Marrella A, Sapio F (2019) Achieving GDPR
compliance of BPMN process models. In: Information Systems
Engineering in Responsible Information Systems - CAiSE Forum 2019,
Rome, Italy, June 3-7, 2019, Proceedings. pp 10–22. https://doi.org/10.
1007/978-3-030-21297-1_2
Bryce Journal of Cloud Computing: Advances, Systems and Applications            (2019) 8:23 Page 14 of 14
2. Brunner M, Sillaber C, Breu R (2017) Towards automation in information
security management systems. In: 2017 IEEE International Conference on
Software Quality, Reliability and Security, QRS 2017, Prague, Czech
Republic, July 25-29, 2017. pp 160–167. https://doi.org/10.1109/qrs.2017.
26
3. Cedric Xing B, Shanahan M, Leslie-Hurd R (2016). IntelÂ software guard
extensions (intelÂ sgx) software support for dynamic memory
allocation inside an enclave 06:1–9
4. Chabanoles N, Ozil P, Farrance M (2015) Bonita BPM: an innovative
bpm-based application development platform to build engaging,
user-oriented business applications. In: BPM (Demos). pp 21–24. http://
ceur-ws.org/Vol-1418/paper5.pdf
5. Gikas C (2010) A general comparison of fisma, hipaa, ISO 27000 and
PCI-DSS standards. Inf Secur J A Glob Perspect 19(3):132–141
6. Government OpenAccess (2019) SME Owners Still in the Dark about
GDPR. www.openaccessgovernment.org/sme-owners-gdpr/57656
7. Horkoff J, Jeusfeld MA, Ralyté J, Karagiannis D (2018) Enterprise modeling
for business agility. Bus Inf Syst Eng 60(1):1–2
8. Lins FAA, Sousa ETG, Rosa NS (2018) A survey on automation of security
requirements in service-based business processes. Int J Web Eng Technol
13(1):3–29
9. Mendling J, Weidlich M (eds) (2012) Business Process Model and Notation
- 4th International Workshop, BPMN 2012, Vienna, Austria, September
12-13, 2012. Proceedings, volume 125 of Lecture Notes in Business
Information Processing. Springer
10. Miloslavskaya NG (2016) Security operations centers for information
security incident management. In: 4th IEEE International Conference on
Future Internet of Things and Cloud, FiCloud 2016, Vienna, Austria,
August 22-24, 2016. pp 131–136. https://doi.org/10.1109/ficloud.2016.26
11. Mont MC, Matteucci I, Petrocchi M, Sbodio ML (2015) Towards safer
information sharing in the cloud. Int J Inf Sec 14(4):319–334
12. Object Management Group (OMG) (2019) Decision Model and Notation
(DMN). OMG Document Number formal/dtc/18-06-04. https://www.omg.
org/spec/DMN/About-DMN/
13. Ouedraogo M, Mignon S, Cholez H, Furnell S, Dubois E (2015) Security
transparency: the next frontier for security research in the cloud. J Cloud
Comput 4:12
14. Picahaco AM, Mesquida AL, Alcover EA, Fluxà B (2010) ISO/IEC 15504 best
practices to facilitate ISO/IEC 27000 implementation. https://doi.org/10.
5220/0003001001920198
15. Priebe C, Vaswani K, Costa M (2017) Enclavedb: A secure database using
sgx. In: 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2018, San Jose,
CA, USA, May 22-26, 2018. pp 3–18. https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2018.00025
16. Saleem J, Adebisi B, Ande R, Hammoudeh M (2017) A state of the art
survey - impact of cyber attacks on sme’s. In: Proceedings of the
International Conference on Future Networks and Distributed Systems,
ICFNDS 2017, Cambridge, United Kingdom, July 19-20, 2017. p 52. https://
doi.org/10.1145/3102304.3109812
17. Salnitri M, Dalpiaz F, Giorgini P (2017) Designing secure business
processes with secbpmn. Softw Syst Model 16(3):737–757
18. Schleicher D, Fehling C, Grohe S, Leymann F, Nowak A, Schneider P,
Schumm D (2011) Compliance domains: A means to model
data-restrictions in cloud environments. In: Proceedings of the 15th IEEE
International Enterprise Distributed Object Computing Conference,
EDOC 2011, Helsinki, Finland, August 29 - September 2, 2011.
pp 257–266. https://doi.org/10.1109/edoc.2011.22
19. Verginadis Y, Michalas A, Gouvas P, Schiefer G, Hübsch G, Paraskakis I
(2017) Password: A holistic data privacy and security by design framework
for cloud services. J Grid Comput 15(2):219–234
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affiliations.
